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THE ROLE OF REGIONAL POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA
This paper focuses pr incipal ly on the question of the fundamental
po l i t i ca l and economic functions of regional policy in the South African
system. A number of interesting and useful contributions on th is subject
have appeared recently1 but the discussion remains in an unsettled
state and further efforts to c la r i f y the issues seem to be needed.
One requirement for dealing sat is factor i ly with the question of the role
of regional policy is the determination of actual past trends in the
regional d is t r ibut ion of the manufacturing employment and the causes of
these trends. There is in fact a remarkable paucity of sol id data on
actual past trends in the geographical d is t r ibut ion of industr ial
employment, and a consequent tendency for some recent discussion of the
role of the state In th is sphere to suffer from reliance on out of date
p
and l nadequate information. One aim of the paper, therefore, i s to
c la r i fy the question of actual trends 1n the inter-regional d is t r ibut ion
of manufacturing employment and the causes of these trends.
I
From the time of the Tomlinson Commission report of 1966, r ight through
to the late-1960's the policy was taken by many, including myself, to be
aimea at increasing "the proportion of Blacks resident in the Bantu
areas" by inf1uencing "the geographical d is t r ibut ion of employment 1 n
manufacturing industry both by direct ly res t r ic t ing the rate of growth of
the larger industr ial centres and by encouraging industr ia l development
at certain 'growth points' situated predominantly in the border areas",
(Bel l , ly73b : 401). There was a great sense of urgency about th i s :
nothing less than the survival of the nation was at stake and in o f f i c i a l
c i rc les at least there seemed to be no doubt that South Africa simply had
to decentralise economic ac t i v i t y on a very grand scale indeed.
Various writers thus saw the objectives of the government's policy of
industr ial decentralisation as essential ly po l i t i ca l i n th is sense. I t
1
 Notable amongst these are Lacey (1982), Z i l l e (1983a and 1983b) and
Hirsch (1983).
2
 On the impact of the state on the location of industry in the
period up to 1970, both Glaser (1983) and Tomlinson (1983), for
instance, refer mainly to data in a more than ten year old study
(Bell 1973b), published at a time when regional industr ial
employment data were not available for any year la ter than 1970.
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was taken that industrial decentralisation was regarded by the government
as worth pursuing in itself for 'political' reasons. It, therefore would
be worthwhile trying to decentralise economic activity even if this
exceeded what was economically optimal, and thus reduced the rate of
economic growth at least in the short to medium-term.
The matter thus seemed fairly clearcut. It was generally thought that
the objective of policy could be expressed in terms of the number of jobs
needed i n the border areas and homel ands i n order to stem the flow of
Black workers to the cities. This view of the aims of industrial
aecentralisation as essentially political in that sense was I believe
particularly reasonable ten or more years ago. It was in response to
essenti al ly poli ti cal problems that the Tomli nson Commi ssi on was
established and furthermore, the period after the Commission's report was
published saw a marked Increase In the rate of unemployment amongst
Whites, Coloureds and Asians as wel 1 as amongst Blacks« The
conditions in which regional policy was being formulated v/ere thus
reminiscent of the general conditions in which the Native Economic
Commission of 1932 delivered Its report, which emphasized the problem of
conflict between Blacks and Whites In the major cities during a time of
high unemployment. The Permanent Committee for the Location of Industry
was thus established in mid-1960 at a time when the rate of growth of
Industrial employment was lower than at any time since the Second World
War and the position was to deteriorate still further in the next two
years.
It was probably clear to many quite early on that pursuit of this
objective, at least on the scale apparently implied by the government's
public statements, would far exceed what was likely to occur
spontaneously if market forces were left to themselves, and what might be
justified in terms of some social, economic optimum, and indeed, even
what was economically possible. Events bore out this view of the
enormous difficulties involved in diverting industry to the development
regions. Hardly any progress was made Initially, as is shown in Table
1. In the period 1961/2 to 1965/6, as the great boom got underway, the
growth of industrial employment 1n the border areas and homelands rose
sharply, but it increased even more sharply in the metropolitan areas.
The proportion of manufacturing employment in the main Industrial centres
increased from 79,6 to 81,9 percent and no headway was made in dealing
with the dangers emphasized by the Tomlinson Commission., On the contrary,
3
 See Bell 1984b.
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TABLE 1
Employment in Manufacturing Industries (%)
Western Cape
Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage
Durban-Pinetown-Inanda
Pr etoria-Witwatersrand-
Vereeniging
Main industrial areas
Rest of South Africa
Republic of South Africa
Sources: The PUV
1956/7
%
16,2
4,9
12,5
46,0
79,6
20,4
100,00
region
1961/2
%
16,5
5,9
12,7
45,3
80,4
19,6
100,00
figures
1965/6 1
%
16,0
6,1
13,2
46,6
81,9
18,1
100,00
for 1979
1967/8
%
15,7
5,9
13,2
46,3
81,1
18,9
100,00
1970
%
15,5
6,4
13,6
45,5
81,0
19,0
100,00
&re estimates
1972
%
15,6
6,1
13,6
44,7
79,9
20,1
100,00
1976
%
14,6
5,6
13,7
44,4
78,3
21,7
100,00
1979
%
14,3
5,3
13,8
43,5
76,9
23,1
100,00
, which assume
that the share of the PWV region as defined in the above table, to
exclude the magi steri al di stri cts of Bri ts, Ni gel and Hei del berg,
declined by the same number of percentage points (0,9) as the PWV region
excluding Brits but including Nigel and Heidelberg which fell from 45,1
percent in 1976 to 44,2 percent in 1979. Since Nigel and Heidelberg are
a very small proportion of the total this must give an estimate very
close to the actual. Estimation is necessitated by the fact that
separate information is not available for Nigel and Heidelberg for 1979.
Mote: See notes to the Appendix to this section. Also note that the
percentages for 1956/7 are based on average employment figures for the
year in each of the regions, whereas for subsequent years they reflect
employment levels as at* a specific date in each year.
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with the rapid growth of employment in this period in the metropolitan
areas, though the problem of unemployment receded, the political problem
of Black urbanisation was greatly increased.4
At the end of the boom of the sixties, probably as a result of the patent
fai1ure of the poli cy of i naustri al decentrali sati on as ori gi nally
envisaged, the authorities resorted to various other measures to stem the
flow of Blacks to the larger cities. That is, the emphasis appears to
have switched to an attempt to achieve a considerable degree of
terri tori al separati on of the races, not by revoluti oni si ng economi c
conditions in the border and Bantu areas, but by tightening 'inf1ux
control1, by 'endorsing out' Africans from the larger urban areas, and by
resettling Africans from White fanning areas in the homelands. The
period 1966 to 1968, as the great boom receded, Is thus marked by various
measures designed to check the movement of Blacks into the major
industrial areas. The Physical Planning Act was but one of these. At
the same time efforts were made to increase the chances of attracting
industry to the periphery by a decision in 1968 to allow White capital
into the homelands, and increases in the financial inducements in the
same year and various dates thereafter.
A change in the perception of the scale of development that could be
achieved in the border areas and homelands thus appears to have set in in
the late 1960s. This is apparent in a statement in January 1970 by
Dr P J Riekert, at the time Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister, that
the "development of the Homelands can .... never be the only aim of
economic policy in South Africa" and that "our development target for the
Bantu areas should be of a more modest nature" (Quoted in Bell 1973a
: 258). It seems to me that at some point in the late 1960s, the nature
of the policy began to be radically transformed. There is a shift
towards an emphasis on direct controls of population movements and
generally towards more purely political arrangements; and away from the
previous apparent emphasis.on the use of economic development to stem the
flow of Blacks.
4 On unemployment rates over this period see Bell (1984b : 16-18).
&
 See Bell iy73a : 259.
*> In the case of the Western Cape, the attempt to check the inflow of
Blacks was accompanied by the adoption of an official Coloured
labour preference policy.
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Yet today the policy of Industrial decentralisation appears to play as
important a part as ever In the government's thinking and would appear to
have been given a shot in the arm by the revised, greatly increased
package of incentives announced at the Good Hope conference of November
1981. If economic decentralisation on a grade scale was seen to have
been a failure, why has it continued to be pursued determinedly? How is
this to be understood?
II
ironically, the authorities in seeking, by means of unsuccessful
decentralisation policies and direct controls on the geographical
movement of Black labour, to deal with the problem of urban Influx, found
that another problem was intensifying in the homelands. The problem was
that of the legitimacy of homeland governments, both in the eyes of their
own people and internationally. This became particularly acute as Black
unemployment rates in the country as a whole began to increase sharply in
the period 1968 to 1972, and then, after declining somewhat during the
gold boom of 1973 to 1974, resumed a secular upward trend from 1975
onwards which, but for a slight decline in the Black unemployment rate in
1980, persisted right through to 1982, and probably beyond. The problem
became especially acute since, owing to influx controls, the unemployment
came to a large extent to be located in the homelands.
Hirsch (1983) indeed sees the legitimation of homeland governments as the
central purpose of the policy, and as representing a switch away from the
objectives which predominated in the sixties. His view of the objectives
of the policy in the sixties seems to be essentially the same as that
adopted by myself in earlier studies (Bell 1973a and 1973b). In his view
they involved "relatively Ineffectual attempts — to relocate some
industry towards the Bantustans but not inside them. Two interlinked
central purposes dominated - the desire to reduce the attraction of the
urban centres which the government regarded as Increasingly dangerous
melting pots, and the wish to draw people from these centres and from the
rapidly capitalising White farms to the bantustans — " {Hirsch 1983 :
13).
From the late 1960s on, however, the "highest priority" became "the
strenghthening of emerging political structures in the bantustans", since
the "economic decline of the bantustans exacerbated by resettlement" was
having effects on the social and political order of things. He says:
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"The limited legitimacy retained by the bantustan hierarchies, from
headman to Chief Minister, rested on their ability to allocate goods and
this was being threatened. In addition resettled people were being
inserted into alien political and social structures which offered them
wery little. Bantustan industries were established to restore faith in
the ability of the system to dispense goods" (Hirsch 1983 : 13). The
switch from an exclusive emphasis on border areas industrialisation to
i ndustri al development wi thi n the home!ands themselves he sees,
therefore, as reflecting the shift of policy from the earlier central
objective of stemming the flow of Africans into the towns, to that of
legitimizing homeland governments. This is a perfectly reasonable view
as far as it goes, and it may well have been the central concern of
policy in the early part of the 1970s and may even remain a consideration
of considerable significance today.
Indeed, Helen Zille (1983b : 176) reports Dr Simon Brand as having stated
in an interview that the objective of decentralisation policy is "to give
sufficient economic content to the policy of homeland development so that
the governments which are created in those states are not simply
fictitious governments but that they have an economic base to create
their own sources of tax revenue to enable them at least in some respects
to act independently from the South African central government"
This view of the policy, however, seems to imply that though the more
ambitious goals of economic decentralization had to be abandoned in the
1i ght of practical experience, the objective of 1egitimizing homeland
governments might be met by a much more modest, practically attainable
rate of decentralization. A difficulty, by contrast with the objectives
of the sixties, is that this motivation does not seem to be easily
quantifiable. The objective, according to Hirsch's view, now appears
rather to be a qualitative one and much more elusive. How much
industrial development (with the emphasis perhaps now more on income and
tax-base creation, rather than on employment creation) in and near the
homelands is needed for this purpose? While the goal of legitimacy for
homeland governments, put in this way is difficult to grasp, Helen Zille
(1983b : 17b) goes on to report Dr Simon Brand as saying, in the same
interview referred to above, and apparently in amplification of his
earlier remarks:
"Influx control must be controlled more through economic measures so that
people will voluntarily remain in and go to certain areas rather than
being forced to do so. That was the crux of the Riekert Commission's
proposals".
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This statement appears to say that i t w i l l be very d i f f i cu l t to
legitimize homeland governments so long as the authorities have to rely
on coercion to stem the flow of Blacks to the metropolitan areas. But in
that case how di f f i rent would the oojective of legitimizing homeland
governments be from that of the 'sixties? I t would seem, very l i t t l e ;
and i t is equally unattainable. I t is nevertheless possible that the
authorities ao in fact regard legitimation of homeland governments as a
major objective of decentralization policy, and even that in the medium
term at least i t has in some measure succeeded in this aim. Indeed, the
homelands policy does not yet appear to have suffered any major setback,
and i t may well be that combined with other pol i t ical measures,
relatively l i t t l e economic decentralisation is needed for this purpose.
Only i f this Is the case is 1t possible to regard Hirsch's view as a
persuasive explanation of the government's persistence with
decentralisation policy during the 'seventies. For, as we shall see
below, though some significant changes in the inter-regional distribution
of manufacturing employment have occurred since the late 1960s, the
degree of 1ndustrial decentralisation actually achieved to date is
relatively small ana certainly fal ls far short of what is needed to make
Blacks "voluntarily remain in and go to certain areas rather than being
forced to do so". For this,,and other reason related to developments in
the seventies, i t seems to be necessary to go beyond Hirsch's thesis to
take into account other possible interpretations of decentralisation
policy.
I l l
In a recent paper I have argued that since the late 1960s and
particularly since the mid-1970s, not only the nature of regional policy,
but of South African economic policy in general appears to have been
completely transformed, and that regional policy must be seen in the
context of these larger changes. The year 1976, I have suggested, may be
seen as a watershed in this process of transformation. This is not only
because of the traumatic political events of that year, though these are
clearly important. Uhat is crucial is that the economy in 1976 went into
a long decline (actually begun in the late 1960s but interrupted by the
gold boom of 1973-1975), which notwithstanding the cyclical upswing of
»-1981 has persisted riyht through to the present.
Bell (iy74a). This paper was written before Hirsch's paper or that
of Lacey (referred to below) came to my attention.
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This long decline in South Africa's trend rate of growth and the
accompanying change in the social philosophy of economic policy-makers
must, in turn, be seen in the context of changes in the international
economic system as a whole. The decline here has largely resulted from
shocks to the economy originating outside the South African economy, and
is intimately related to the problem of secular stagnation which has
beset the advanced industrial countries of Western Europe and North
America in the past ten years or more. And, just as in the case of some
of these advanced industrial countries, where it has spawned Thatcherism
and Reaganism, this has haa a major impact on economic policy in South
Africa.
W.W. Rostow (1978) the well known neo-classical theorist of the process
of economic developments, has interpreted the rise of the new classical
economics and its Thatcherite policy implications essentially as a
political revolt against continual increases in public expenditure when
private real incomes are stagnating. That is, he sees it essentially as
the consequence of a taxpayers' revolt, and whatever its economic
consequences, it has thus far been a great political success. This
applies equally to South Africa, where these tendencies have been
intensified by racial conflict and rapid political change. In the
context of slow economic growth, however, the conflict has not simply
involved questions of the size and allocation of government expenditure,
but also the distribution of income In general as partly determined by
the organisational activity and bargaining strength of workers.
In the South African context there was apparently a significant increase
in the or9anisational activity and bargaining strength of Black workers
in the 1970s, culminating in the industrial relations reforms following
the Wiehahn Committee report of 1979. In these circumstances, regional
policy may be seen as one component of a general strategy of exposing
industry and workers in the major industrial centres to greater
competition both from abroad and within the country, in an attempt to
counteract the potential impact of these political changes.
Amongst the most Important aspects of government policy in this respect,
in my view, are those relating to foreign exchange markets and foreign
exchange. It is noteworthy, for instance, that by contrast with the
1920s when the proportions of the Poor White problem were growing
steadily and the government adopted its protectionist "South Africa First"
- 9 -
policy, tnere is strong political support today, when the rate of
unemployment particularly (but not only) amongst Blacks is showing a
long-term tendency to increase, for a more open trade and foreign
exchange policy. This, I would argue, cannot be justified, taking
account of the currently highly protectionist nature of the international
economic system, the magnitude of the problems of adjustment with which
South AFrica is faced, and the severity of the current recession. In my
view, it can be understood only in terms of the need to discipline
industry and labour.
Regional policy, as I have suggested, should be seen as but one aspect of
this overall approach in a period of slow economic growth and
comparatively rapid political change. It is intimately connected,
however, with other aspects of the current approach to economic policy.
For instance, a more open trading system tends to intensify the problem
of foreign competition, ana hence, as I shall argue in more detail below,
to accelerate the process of industrial decentralisation. This combined
with the greatly increased package of regional incentives introduced in
November 1981, the direct controls which increase the number of Blacks
dependent for employment on development in the border areas and
homelands, and the much more conservati ve i ndustri al relati ons
legislation applicable In the homelands, tend to weaken the competitive
position of workers in the metropolitan areas.
Thus, quite apart from any contribution it may make to the physical
separation of the races on a geographical basis, regional policy has a
political effect as a constraint on the organisation and other activities
of Black labour in the metropolitan areas. Thus, whereas in the earlier
stages of regional economic policy, in the latter 1950s and 1960s, it was
perhaps correct to see its role primarily as that of increasing the
security of Whites by reducing the number of Blacks in the metropolitan
areas it is questionable whether it is plausible to see it in this light
today. An extra political dimension, quite distinct from any attempt to
legitimize homeland governments, therefore, seems crucial and indeed
predominant now. Thus whereas the functions of regional policy remain
"political" in a sense, the role of the policy appears to have been
completely transformed. No longer is it merely a "numbers game" or a
matter of legitimizing homeland governments, but rather a policy
Involving essentially qualitative mechanisms of control applying to
Blacks in metropolitan areas.
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When looked at it in this way, the government's persistence with this
policy becomes comprehensible, despite economic decentralisation as such
being utterly discredited as a means of significantly influencing the
geographical distribution of the Black population.8 The rate of
development of manufacturing employment and output in the industrial
periphery required to serve this particular function of regional policy
is much smaller than that needed to make a significant contribution to
terri tori al segregation, or possibly even to 1egi timi ze homeland
governments. Substantial but not massive Industrial development in the
border and Black areas is enough to contribute significantly, along with
an open trade policy and other measures, to the discipline of industry
and workers in the metropolitan areas. This view of regional policy is
consistent with the prevalent philosophy of South Africa's economic
policy makers, in which the alleged merits of maximum exposure of
participants in various markets to competition are central. It enables
one to make sense of regional policy without having to assume that
government really does aim to stem the flow of Blacks to the cities by
economic rather than other means, but is ignorant of or unwilling to
accept the implications of the insuperable obstacles to the attainment of
this goal.
In the next section we go on to consider the view outlined above in more
detail in the light of empirical evidence.
IV
What emerges from analysis of the basic data is that whereas between the
years 1956/7 and 1965/6 the proportion of manufacturing employment
situated in the main Industrial areas increased from 7916 to 81,9
percent, between 1965/6 and 1979 1t fell without interruption from 81,9
percent to 76,9 percent. This suggests that in the latter half of the
1960s Q fairly fundamental structural change occurred in the relative
strength of the forces making for geographical concentration of
industrial employment compared with those making for decentralisation or
6
 It also enables one to see that the obvious Inevitability of having
to rely on coercive measures to check the movement of Blacks to the
cities is not inconsistent with the basic function of the policy,
and indeed, In so far as such measures increase the volume of
unemployment in the homelands and thus affect wage rates and labour
supply there, they are actually consistent with it.
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deconcentration. There had previously been fluctuations up and down In
the proportionate share of the main industrial regions in manufacturing
employment, but never a completely uni nterrupted decli ni ng trend over
such a long period, of thirteen or fourteen years.
What particularly, of the border areas and homelands? These
collectively, as Table 2 shows, substantially increased their
proportionate share of manufacturing employment without interruption from
11,75 percent in 1967/8 to 15,54 percent in 1979, having prior to that
declined from 12,16 percent in 1961/2 to 11,75 percent in 1967/8. The
probably fundamental structural change in the balance of forces making
for concentration and deconcentration is thus reflected in the particular
case of the border areas and homelands as well.
These changes imply substantial inter-regional differences in the average
annual percentage growth rates, as Table 3 Indicates. Whereas the
average annual rate of growth of manufacturing employment In the main
industrial areas was 5,9 percent in 1961/2 to 1967/8 and fe l l to 2,1
percent in 1967/8 to 1979, the coresponding rate of growth in the border
areas and homelands increased slightly from 5,2 percent in 1962 to 5,3
percent in 1967/8 to 1979. Thus, during the 1970s when the rate of
growth of industrial employment declined sharply compared with the
'sixties in the country as a whole, the rate of growth In the border
areas and homelands picked up, and there was consequently a marked
improvement in the employment growth performance of the industrial
periphery relative to the core.
What 1s perhaps even more remarkable is the improvement of the growth
performance of the homelands relative to the major metropolitan areas,
the border areas and apparently also the previous rates of increase In
industrial employment. The process of deconcentration implied by the
figures cited in the previous paragraphs, therefore, cannot be readily
written off as merely one of "suburbanisation" of industry from the main
industrial areas, rather than as one involving general decentralisation
of outlying areas, including particularly the homelands themselves. As
Table 1 shows, throughout the period 1965/6 to 1979 there occurred a
relative transfer of industrial employment from the PWV region to the
Durban-Pinetown region. Within Natal, while the greater Pietennaritzburg
region grew more rapidly than any other part of the province in the years
1967/8 to 1976, from 1976 to 1979 employment growth was most rapid
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TABLE 2
• V •
Employment in
(excluding Transkei)
Cape
Natal
Transvaal
Total border areas and
homelands
Rest of South Africa
excluding border and,
• homelands
Manufacturing Industry' in Border and Homelands
 :.
and Rest of South Africa as a Percentage of
Manufacturing Employment
1961/2
3,07
6,53
2,56
12,16
7,44
1965/6
2,93
6,42
2,52
11,87
6,23
1967/8
2,88
6,43
2,46
11,75
7,15
1970
2,91
6,29
2,57
11,77
7,23
South African
1972
3 ,
6 ,
3 ,
1 2 ,
7 ,
06
78
00
83
27
1976 1979
3,09
7,53
3,92
14,54 1
6,95
3,37
7,87
4,30
5,54
7,56
Rest of South Africa
includinq border areas
- *- and homelands
Total border areas and
Homelands
19,6 18,1 . 18,9 19,0 20,1 21,7 23,10
100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 10 0,00 100,00 100,00
Sources: Based on employment figures compiled from various manufacturing census
reports
Notes: ' (1) The corresponding regions included in the provincial totals for 1967/8,
1970 and 1972 are: Cape 0504, 0602, 0603, 0604; Natal 0902-0910; Transvaal 1101,
1104-1108. And for 1976 they are: Cape 0501-0503, 0601-0603, less the Albany
magisterial district; Natal 0702-0703, 0801-0808; Transvaal 1001-1003 plus the Brits
magisterial district- Though the region codes differ, the magisterial districts
comprising the various provincial totals are, with negligible exceptions, the same over
time, and the figures are therefore comparable.
(2) The percentage share of the Transvaal border and Black areas excluding
Bophutatswana increased from 3,35 in 1976 to 3,73 in 1979. It has been assumed that the
1976 Transvaal figure of 3,93 including Bophutatswana increased by the same number of
percentage points to 4,30 in 1979. Separate figures for Bophutatswana are available only
for 1976, and this territory was not included in the 1979 industrial census. •
(3) Employment in the Transkei is not reflected in any of the above figures.
It was not covered by either the 1976 or 1979 industrial censuses and it has thus for
reasons of comparability been removed from the Cape figures for earlier years as well.
TABLE 3
Average Annual Rates of Growth of Manufacturing Employment in
Various Regions 1961/2 to 1979 (%)
1961/2- 1967/8
1967/8 1979
1961/2 1965/6 1967/8 1970 1972 1976
1965/6 1967/8 1970 1972 1976 1979
1- Border areas and homelands 5.2 5.3 6.5 2.2 5.2 6.1 B.1 1.4
2. Rest of South Africa 5.1 4.6 5.2 5.0 5.5 4.3 6.9 1.4
3. Main Industrial Areas 5.9 2.1 7.4 2.3 4.9 1.0 4.2 -1 .5
4. Republic of South
Africa 5.7 2.7 7.0 2.8 5.0 1.6 4.7 -0.9
5. Western Cape
6. Durban-Pinetown 6.3 3.1 7.7 3.0 6.4 1.6 8.7 -0.8
7. PWV 6.1 . 2.1 7.7 2.4 4.2 0.8 4.6 -1.6
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outside the Ourban-Pinetown-Pietermaritzburg axis. Indeed, as Table 4
shows, in the period 1976 to 197J manufacturing employment in the Durban-
Pi netown region decreased by over four thousand and in the
Pietermaritzburg region by about two hundred. Increases in employment
thus took place only outside the Durban-Pietermaritzburg axis, where
employment altogether increased by 2078. This was partly due to growth
in the Natal Midlands and in the Newcastle and Richards Bay areas, but
what is particularly noteworthy is that only 768 of the increase occurred
in "White" Natal, the bulk of i t (1310 jobs) having recurred in Kwazulu,
which on the very small base of 2839 in 1976 represents an
extraordinarily large increase of 46,1 percent. This is in very marked
contrast with the absolute decrease of 3 percent in the country as a
whole ana of 0.8 percent in Natal in particular. This phenomenon,
however, was not confined to Natal, and i t s widespread nature is
suggested by the fact that between 1976 and 1979 even the Ciskeian border
ana homeland areas increased their share of national industrial
employment significantly (albeit from a small base). Whereas in the Cape
border areas and homelanas manufacturing employment increased by 65
percent, inside the Ciskei i t rose from 721 to 2019, that i s , by 180
percent.
The trends described above represent a remarkable reversal of the earlier
treno towards geographical concentration, and as such is a phenomenon of
considerable importance, particularly for the long-term. But the actual
number of jobs involved in the border areas and homelands is quite
small. From 1967/0 to 1976 industrial employment in these regions
increased by 10458 jobs per annum and according to my calculations, based
on earlier performance, no more than half of these can be attributed to
the government's regional policy. And, for the homelands in particular,
as high as the percentage rates of growth have been, the absolute
increases of 1310 in Kwazulu and of 1298 in the Ciskei, in the period
from 1976 to 1979, are very small indeed. Taken overall, therefore,
these nuniDers of extra jobs clearly cannot be expected to have had any
significant impact on the geographical distribution of the black
population, or, one would have thought, in giving legitimacy to homeland
governments. The significance of these figures, therefore, l ies mainly
in tiie picture which they present for 1967/8 to 1976 of historically low
rates of growth of manufacturing employment in the metropolitan areas,
combined with a marked relative improvement in the performance of the
border areas and homelands, and for 1976 to 1979 in the considerable
absolute decline in employment in the metropolitan areas, together with
the fact that increases in industrial employment elsewhere, though slight
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TABLE 4
Employment In Manufacturing Industry in Natal by Main Region within the
a Percentage of South African Manufacturing Employment
1976
Number % Number
Change 1976
to 1979
% Number
Durban/Pinetown/Inanda
Rest of Natal (i.e. Natal
less Durban/Pinetown/Inanda)
Pletermaritzburg region
Durban/Pinetown/Inanda/
Pietermaritzburg
Natal less Durban/Pinetown/
Inanada/Pietermaritzburg
KwaZulu
Natal less Durban/Pinetown/
Inanda/Pietermaritzburg
and KwaZulu
Natal
Republic of South Africa 1
186
102
42
228
60
2
57
288
360
427
351
180
607
171
839
332
778
000
13.7
7.5
3.1
16.8
4.4
0.2
4.2
21.2
100.00
182
104
41
224
62
4
58
286
1 320
326
247
998
324
249
149
100
573
000
13.8
7.9
3.2
17.0
4.7
0.3
4.4
21.7
100.00
- 4
. 1
-
- 4
2
1
- 2
-40
101
896
182
283
078
310
768
205
000
Source: The data for 1979 are provisional figures provided by Central
Statistical Services In July 1983 in advance of publication.
Note: The figures for Natal Include KwaZulu. The Pietermaritzburg region for
the purposes of this table includes the magisterial districts of
Pietermaritzburg, Camperdown, Richmond, Ixopo, New Hanover, Lions
River, Umvoti, Kranskop and Lower Tugela.
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in this period, were largely confined to the border areas and homelands.
The significance of the period 1976-79 is increased by the fact that
total manufacturing employment has gone into decline again since the boom
of 1980-81, and that it seems quite likely that during the current
recession the same tendencies are in operation as during the period
1976-79. Thus for a considerable proportion of the past ten years a
major part of the impetus to the expansion of industrial employment has
been situated in the border areas and homelands.
The developments thus inciicate a marked relative shift in the inter-
regional distribution of manufacturing employment towards the border
areas, due to a very high proportion of new industrial employment being
located in these regions. Industrialists and workers in the metropolitan
areas have been experiencing intensive competition "at the margin" from
firms and workers in the border areas and homelands. This is crucial for
the bargaining position of workers of all races in the major centres, and
is in keepi ng wi th the i nterpretati on of decentrali sati on poli cy
suggested above. It is of central importance for this interpretation,
which essentially sees decentralisation policy as a device for curbing
the growing organisational activity of workers in the 1970s, to consider
the causes of the trends described above.
As we noted above a fundamental change in the relative strength of forces
making for geographical concentration and those making for
aeconcentration appears to have occurred in the late 1960s. Given the
iming of this change, it is arguable that it was in some measure at least
related to market forces whose operation preceded the introduction of the
various direct controls in the late sixties. The tendency towards
deconcentration after I960 may partly be seen simply as the result of an
intensification of these forces due to the rapidly increasing
producti vi ty and i nternational competi ti veness of the newly
industrialising countries of the Far East and Latin America and of Japan,
9 Though manufacturing census data are not available for any year
since 1579, Spies (1984) and Bridgman (1984) report continuing
rapid rates of increase in manufacturing employment in Kwazulu and
the Ciskei respectively, although for the country as a whole it
increased only slightly from 1468400 in 1981 to 1473700 in 1982,
and declined to 1392000 in 1983. Indeed, Bridgman, in conformity
with the picture presented above, observes that in the Ciskei the
number of applications for the regional incentives tends to
increase during times of recession. Thompson (1984) also reports
rapid industrial expansion in the past few years in the
Pietermaritzburg area.
10 This also suggests that a very high proportion of new industrial
employment i n South Africa i s being subsidi sed i n terms of the
regional incentives. Whether these subsidies were a decisive
factor in bringing about these trends, however, remains to be
considered.
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whicn also assumed major proportions in the late sixties. There are
a number of reasons for thinking that there were in operation in the
sixties certain forces making for a market-related, spontaneous process
of industrial decentralisation. First, the tendency for the share of the
main industrial areas in the country's total manufacturing employment to
decline sets in about 1965/6 (as we noted above), at a time when the size
of tne financial inducements available in the development regions was
very small and before direct controls via the Physical Planning Act were
introduced.
Second, in the case of two major labour-intensive industries, textiles
and clothing, the PWV region experienced substantial decline before 1960,
indeed even before the industrial decentralisation programme had really
got underway, and the subsequent decline of this region and the
metropolitan areas collectively (Durban-Pinetown being the one exception)
12
rua> thus partly nave been a simple continuation of the earlier trend.
Third, the tendency for employment in the texti les and clothing
industries to shif t away from the PWV region mainly towards
Durban-Pinetown and the Cape Peninsula, rather than towards small
industrial centres, was in evidence well before 1968 and therefore
probably cannot be attributed entirely to the application of the Physical
11
 Lacey (1982 : 49) also links decentralisation to the fact that " in
line with other third world countries' efforts to industrialise,
South Africa is forced to compete with countries l ike Taiwan,
Singapore and Brazil to attract foreign investment". However, she
does not relate this either to the timing of the impact of the
industrialising countries on the interntional trading system or to
empirical trends in the inter-regional distribution of industry in
South Africa. She also appears to focus exclusively on the role of
government intervention, particularly via the relocation
allowances, rather than consider the possible role of market
pressures as such.
12 The PWV region's share of employment in the clothing industry, for
instance, fe l l from 44,0 percent in 1956/7 to 35,1 percent in
1&67/U, whereas i t fe l l a further 12,6 percentage points in the
next el even years from 1967/ti to 1979. Its share of texti 1 es
employment fe l l from 21,6 percent in 1959-60 to 15,1 percent in
lyfaii, and by only a further 4,2 percentage points in the next eight
years from 1968 to li>76. There thus appears to be no just i f icat ion
for speaking of the decline in the Transvaal clothing industry
after 1968 as "unprecedented", as Glaser {1983:25)does.
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Planning Act and other direct controls to the PWV region and the
11exemption of the other two centres.
I t appears therefore that there was in operation a spontaneous tendency
towards industrial deconcentration in certain industries going as far
back as the f i f t i es , anu that the pressure in this direction may well
have increased from the late 1960s on as international competition from
the newly industrialising coutries and Japan intensified. This may
partly be seen as the result of a striving after lower wage rates through
the substitution of Black labour in the less industrialized areas, for
more expensive White, Coloured, Asian and indeed, also Black labour
available in the larger industrial centres. The South African labour
market is segmented both on a racial basis within metropolitan areas by
the job labour bar, and on a regional basis by influx control measures of
various kinds; and the tendency towards a geographical redistribution of
industry may thus be seen partly as a means of circumventing both these
forms of labour market segmentation. Given the obstacles to inter-racial
substitution within the metropolitan areas the incentive to make greater
use of non-white labour in an attempt to cut costs became translated into
an incentive, especially in the case of the PWV region, wth i ts almost
exclusively White and African labour force, for existing plants to
relocate and for new p1 ants to be establi shed in i ndustrial centres
14
outside of the main industrial areas.
In textiles the Cape Peninsula's share of employment increased from
12,^ percent in 1962 to 15,3 percent in 1968, but then rose by only
anotner 0,y percentage points before tai l ing off somewhat after
TWO; and the Durban-Pinetown regions share rose from 20,5 percent
in 1959/60 to 27,7 percent in 1968, but thereafter rose by only a
further 0,0 percentages point before tai l ing off after 1970.
Similarly, in clothing the Cape Peninsula's share rose from 31,0
percent in 1956/7 to 31 ,S percent in 1966, and then gained 0,8
percentage points from 1968 to 1976. In the case of
Uurban-Pinetown the proportionate share of employment in the
clothing industries was already strongly on the rise, having
increased from 17,0 percent in 1959/60 to 20,1 percent in 1968, and
though in the next eleven years to 1979 i t rose by another 10
percentage points this may be seen at least partly as a
continuation of the earlier firmly establised trend.
See Bell (1983 : 50) which shows for instance that the average
earnings of Black workers in the Natal border areas and Kwazulu
were only 63 percent of those in the Southern Transvaal in 1976.
During the early 1960s the country was experiencing comparatively high
unemployment rates and the pressures making for decentralisation would
thus have been comparatively weak. With the great boom from 1963 to
1966 however, the labour markets of the metropolitan areas probably
tightened significantly, and the incentive to move to less developed
areas in order to make greater use of cheap, Black labour would also have
been greatly increased by the intensified competition from the newly
industrializing contries and Japan which several writers date as assuming
major proportions in the late s ixt ies. ' The increased organizational
activity and bargaining strength of Black workers in the 1970's noted
above, which culminated in the industrial relations reforms following the
Uiehahn Committee report of 1979, would probably also have increased the
attraction of the border areas and homelands, especially as industrial
relations legislation in the homelands is today much less progressive
tnan in the rest of the country.
Trie tenaency towards overall deconcetration after 1968 noted above
therefore, may well have been partly due to factors having l i t t l e to do
with government intervention via either the financial 1nducements or
direct controls. Indeed, Lacey (1984 : 48-49) seems to go so far as to
suggest that the basic motivation for the government's decentralisation
policy is an economic one. She refers, for instance, to the growing
unprofitability of export industries in the urban areas due to the
monopolistic position of white trade unions, the ineffeciency of migrant
workers in metropolitan areas, and the need to compete with countries
like Taiwan, Singapore and Brazil to attract foreign capital. This leads
Hirsch (1983 : 11) to dismiss Lacey's argument on the grounds that i t
fai ls to answer two questions: "First ly — i f decentralisation is such
a tempting prospect to capital, why have so few capitals taken i t up?
Seconaly, why has the state been forced to assist capital to the extend
i t has through cheap loans and investment where private capital feared to
treand".17
^ See, for instance, Douwes-Uekker and Watts (1973) on the problem of
unemployment amongst Indians in the Durban metropolitan area in
1</b3. Also, despite the application of influx control in the
Western Cape in the period 1959-60, Coloured wage rates did not
rise relative to other regions suggesting no general shortage of
labour in the Western Cape (See Bell 1983 : 40).
16
 See, for instance, Beenstock (1983).
17 in this view, i t appears that the relocation opportunities which
the f i nanci al i nducements provi de, and the state's policy of
relocating people in the homelands, which increase labour supply
and lower wagers in the homelands, are instruments for dealing with
the problems of the non-competitiveness of manufacturing in
metropolitan areas.
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Hirsch, however, perhaps too hastily dismisses Lacey's interpretation of
decentralisation. The evidence considered above suggests that market
forces might well have been attracting capital to the border areas and
homelands, a possibility which Hirsch does not adequately consider.
While there may be forces making for spontaneous decentralisation,
however, as Lacey's view implies there would be, this does not
necessarily mean that the government's policy of industrial
decentralisation must be motivated by economic considerations. In the
face of economic pressures, such as internationl competition making for
industrial decentralisation, it may make sense for government to
accelerate this process up to a point by means of labour training and
other regional incentives for purely economic reasons. Indeed, given
GATT rules, labour-training subsidies and regional subsidies may serve as
a useful second-best form of protection of South African manufacturing
against foreign competition. The existence of any spontaneous tendency
towards deconcentration, however, does not imply that it is economically
desirable to accelerate this process to any significant extent. Lacey's
argument is, at best, incomplete in this respect. In that her
explanation depends heavily on economic motivations for industrial
decentralisation policy, without adequate analysis of the economic case
for the policy, her view does not appear to be satisfactory.
Hirsch's second question, which he claims Lacey's argument also fails to
answer, raises the problem whether the financial assistance provided by
the state to firms in the border areas and homelands through cheap loans
and investment, has in fact been decisive In bringing about the
industrial decentralisation which has actually occurred. Hirsch seems to
take it that the mere fact that substantial subsidies have been offered
ana given to industrialists means that these subsidies must have been
necessary for any industrial decentralisation actually achieved. This
seems to be implied in some other recent contributions too.
For instance, Todes and Waston (1984 : 23) question the view that the
industrial decentralisation observed could to a large extent have been a
spontaneous process and tend to suggest that the financial Inducements
have had a significant effect. They claim (p.23) that may "argument is
based mainly on the movement of clothing out of the metropolitan areas".
In fact, in the work to which they refer (Bell 1983) textiles and
clothing were dealt with in detail simply because as large,
labour-intensive sectors they are important examples of the problem, but
in fact I stated (Bell 1983 : 82) in the light of the empirical evidence:
- 21 -
"In the new South Africn inter-regional devision of labour, i t is not
only in the highly labour-intensive, low ski l l - intensity sectors that a
substantial redistribution is occurring away from the industrial core of
tne system. The newly industrializing countries obtained a firm foothold
f i r s t in unskilled, labour-intensive sectors, but have since moved up
rapidly in the technological and ski l l hierachy of the world's industrial
structure. Similarly in the changing inter-regional division of labour,
there has also been a substantial relative shift from the PWV region in
certain heavy, fair ly skill-intensive industries as wel l" .
Furthermore this does not seem to be in the least inconsistent with the
notion of spontaneous decentralisation, since such capital-intensive,
highly-skilled sectors may have been attracted to the development regions
because of proximity to raw materials or markets rather than subsidies.
In addition even in the case of these industries there is the immediate
advantage of cheaper unskilled and semi-skilled Black labour, and the
somewhat longer term prospect, aided by labour-training subsidies, of a
18
cheaper supply of labour at increasinly high levels of s k i l l . Also
even in the case of capital-intensive, skil l- intensive Industries,
another major attraction in the sphere of labour would probably be the
weaker state of trade unions in those areas.
Todes and Waston also question the significance of spontaneous
decentralisation on the grounds that the clothing and textiles
industries, are "a small proportion of manufacturing industry outside of
the four major metropolitan areas". In fact, however, textiles and
clothing employment {according to o f f i c ia l , census data), together
comprised 22 percent of total employment in non-metropolitan Natal and
1933,4 percent in the greater East London region in 1979. In view x>f
these significant proportions, any tendency towards spontaneous
decentralisation in these two sectors, such as we described earlier,
would have had a considerable impact on the rate of growth of
Manufacturing
1<> Bell 11*83 : 63. See also Amsden (1980) on de-skil l ing and the
comparative advantange of Third World countries.
l y In fact, their Table 29, to which they refer in support of thier
contention, shows each sector's employment in non-metropolitan
areas as a percentage of the national total for the sector, and
this gives figures for textiles and clothing of 6,2 percent and
11,7 percent respectively. This, however, seems much less relevant
in assessing the potential for unsubsidised industrialisation than
the figures cited above.
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employment in the border areas and homelands relative to the rest of the
country. The other empirical evidence which they adduce in questioning
the relative significance of spontaneous decentralisation also does not
support the idea that the financial inducements are the predominant
determinant of industrial location. They also acknowledge (p.21) that
there are advantages for certain industries in the growth centres which
l ie in "a combination of the benefits to be obtained from incentives and
a supply of cheap, available labour", and none of their evidence rules
out the possibility that the impact of the financial inducements
themselves was comparatively sl ight. They say, for instance {p.25), that
"incentives appear as a reason for location in almost half the cases,
though labour - as suggested by Bell - is perceived as an important
reason for location, and an advantage in many cases". Their Table 10
shows labour supply and cheap labour as mentioned in 25 cases in border
areas and homelands, whereas the inducements are mentioned only in 19
cases. Indeed, somewhat curiously they themselves at one point (p.23)
suggest several reasons why they would not expect the impact of the
incentives to be significant. But apart from th is , their statistics are
of doubtful value owing to what they describe at the outset as "several
prooler.is with the use of the survey data", because of the
unrepresentativeness of their sample in several significant respects
including the fact that their "sample as a whole over-represents the more
capital-intensive sectors".
Further, in considering the possibility that market-related competitive
pressures have been a major reason for the reversal of , the earlier
tendency towards industrial concentration, i t must be remembered that
this reversal, though of fundamental importance, has involved a
relatively small impact in terms of the number of additional jobs per
annum in the border areas and homelands. Spontaneous market pressures,
thus, could well have been responsible to a significant extent for the
change in the trend. Finally, i t must be noted that the fact that
government has paid out considerable sums of money in regional subsidies
does not mean that these have had any significant effect. The monetary
values of the subsidies as reported by the Decentralisation Board are not
a good guide to the costs of the policy, or, in other words, to the
extent to which the subsidies have served to offset the real
disadvantages of producing in the development regions. This is partly
because what is paia to firms probably exceeds by a substantial amount
what is needed to induce them to site their plants in the development
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regions. That is, a significant part of it is probably simply in the
nature of a pure, income transfer from taxpayers to industrialists - a
sort of yift to industrialists which they are naturally glad to have but
which is not needed to compensate them for real economic disadvantages of
location in the development regions. This of course does not mean that
the financial inducements have had no effect, especially since they were
yredtly increased with effect from early 1902. However, it is arguable
for the perioa up to 1979 for which we have reliable, manufacturing
census aata, that they had relatively little effect, and that since 1982
the inducements have been greatly in excess of what has been necessary
for the increases in industrial employment in the border areas and
homelands for which subsidies have been provided. Also, given the
earlier trends, it is 1ikely that a significant proportion of the
additional jobs which have actually materialized in the period since 1981
would have occurred without the greatly increased packages of incentives
announced at the Good Hope Conference.^
In so far as Government has had a significant influence on the trend
towards industrial decentralisation evident since the late 'sixties', it
has probably been mainly through the controls on population movements and
on the use of Black labour in the metropolitan areas which, as noted
earlier, came to be increasingly applied from the period 1966-68 on. I
have argued so far that the tendency towards industrial deconcentration
probably reflected market forces, as distinct from the effect of
financial inducements. What has to be recognized, however, is that
industrialists have found it attractive to establish plants in cheap
labour areas in the face of competitive pressures wery largely because of
the job colour bar inside the metropolitan areas and influx controls.
That is, as argued earlier, they have found this attractive as a means of
circumventing both these forms of labour market segmentation. In view of
this, what is crucial is that in the late sixties there was a marked
increase in the degree of segmentation of the labour market as a result
of the Introduction of various measures, of which the Physical Planning
20 It is, of course, also the case that in a period of slow economic
growth and stagnating incomes, even pure income transfers are by no
means a negligible consideration. This is especially so in the
case of industrial development inside the independent homelands,
whose governments in terms of the present regional programme are
required to bear half the costs of subsidising industry. These
sums could doubtless be put to better us either in the homelands or
elsewhere in South Africa.
- 24 -
Act was but one. Thus when one talks of market forces having been at
work to decentralise industry, one has to understand that such forces
have had to operate within the framework created by these institutional
22
changes.
This does not detract from the fact that a tendency towards industrial
decentralisation was evident before the measures of the late 1960s and
that this tendency, reinforced by the significant intensification of
international competition at about the same time, would have been
expected to persist without any other changes. The attractions of cheap
labour which were in operation up to that point, however, were probably
considerably strengthened by those created by the greater degree of
labour market segmentation. They were strengthened yet further with the
significant increase in the organisational act ivi ty and bargaining
23strength of Black Workers in the seventies which, as noted earlier,
culminated in the industrial relations reforms fol1owing the W1ehahn
Committee report of 1979. This was especially so since, with the
creation of self-governing and independent homelands, industrial
relations legislation in the homelands either remained unchanged or
became more conservative than i t had been. Today, therefore, there is a
21 As noted earlier, in case of the Western Cape, segmentation was
intensified by the adoption of an off ic ia l Coloured labour
preference policy. In the Durban-Pinetown region, though there is
no off icial Indian labour preference policy, i t is striking that in
this region too Black manufacturing employment has been Increasing
at a much slower rate than total manufacturing employment. Thus,
for whatever reason, in the Western Cape Blacks as a proportion of
the industrial labour force declined from 16,4 percent in 1967/8 to
12,9 percent in 1979, and in Durban-Pinetown the proportion of
Blacks after rising from 47,8 percent in 1967/8 to 50,3 percent in
1972 feel to 47,4 percent in 1979. These figures for
Durban-Pinetown contrast with much higher and rising proportions of
Blacks in the industrial labour force of non-metropolitan Natal.
(See Bell 1983).
22 Much of burden of industrial decentralisation has thus fallen upon
Blacks, rather than on taxpayers. In the case of those actually
employed in the border areas and homelands, i t has taken the form
of lower wage rates and worse conditions of service than would have
been avai1abl e to them but for ( i ncreasi ng) 1abour market
seymentation; and in the case of others outright unemployment.
2 i
 See also Lacey (1982 : 46) for a somewhat fu l ler description of
these developments during the seventies.
considerable gulf between industrial relations legislation in the
homelands and the rest of South Afr ica.2 4 These developments alone
woula De expected to have had an influence on the inter-regional
distribution of manufacturing employment in the seventies and especially,
perhaps, the eiyhties. They provide another reason for questioning the
emphasis which some place on the financial inducements as the fundamental
factor in industrial decentralisation in South Africa.
The view taken in this paper is basically in agreement with Lacey's (1982
: 49) contention that "the central feature of the 1970s has been the
re-remergence of class struggle", and that this has been a decisive
factor for industrial decentralisation. Hirsch has tended to overlook
the "tempting prospect to capital" offered by decentralisation, evidence
for wlricn has presented above, and on which, as he suggests, Lacey's
thesi s appears to rely. I t i s nevertheless questionable whether the
policy of industrial decentralisation can ultimately be explained in
terms of economic causes and or intentions, as Lacey apparently suggests
i t can. The existence of a spontaneous tendency towards industrial
deconcentration does not necessarily allow one to reduce the motivations
of state policy to short to medium-term economic interests. I t does not
imply that i t is economically desirable to accelerate an existing
spontaneous process to any significant extent.
In the l iyht of rapid polit ical change, changing industrial relations,
the declining rate of growth of the economy, and the overall
re-orientation of economic policy in the seventies, the policy of
industrial decentralisation should be seen essentially as a means of
constraining the organisational act ivi ty and bargaining power of Black
workers in the metropolitan areas. The emphasis therefore is on
industrial decentralisation as involving essentially qualitative
mechaninsms of polit ical control on workers in the metropolitan areas
by
2 4
 This is described in detail in an as yet unpublished study by Alan
Whiteside.
2 b
 This is especially so in so far as i t has been necessary ot apply
direct controls on the movement of Black labour and i ts use in the
metropolitan areas, to influence the geographical distribution of
the Black population. Lacey's claim {p.48) that the state's policy
of relocating people in te Bantustans has Increased their
vulnerability to exploitation through the payment of low wages, and
that thi s policy is "i nextri cably 1 i nked wi th the state's
decentralisation policy", seems to suggest that influx control and
relocation of people were motivated primarily by economic
considerations.
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means of competition from firms and workers in the border areas and
homelands. Fergus Murray has argued in similar vein for the cases of
several European contries. He states that whereas for generations i t was
assumed that there was a tendency in capitalism towards greater and
greater concentration of production (p.75), an incentive for
decentralisation was provided by "a change in the balance of class
forces", when "labour rebelled and markets began to stagnate" (p.77).
While, according to Murray, decentralisation was i n i t i a l l y adopted in
Italy as a short-term strategy aimed at evading the labour movement's
advances, the longer terra aim of decentralisation, including geographical
decentralisation, is "the destruction of the spontaneous organisation of
the mass worker on a collective basis" (p.93). In South Africa, the
advantages of decentralisation were in i t i a l l y perceived and acted upon by
industry i tse l f . From the late 1960s on, but especially from 1973 on and
during the long, severe recession of 1975-79, however, as the rate of
unemployment rose, as the unions became more radical, and the pressure
for industrial relations reforms increased, the advantages of regional
decentralisation as a counter to union power came to be more clearly
perceived, and the transformation of the functions of decentralisation
policy was more or less complete.
He particularly mentions '"unfavourable1 industrial relations" as
an important reason for industrial restructuring, including
geographical decentralisation, as well as employment legislation;
though he also mentions incentives, grants and subsides amongst
other factors (p.78-80). He also suggests that this process is
most l ikely to occur in tose industries were there is a high
d iv is ib i l i ty of the production cycle - such as aeronautics,
marketing, electronics, clothing and shoes, rather than industries
which require a large, unified production s i te.
REFERENCES
Amsden, A.H. (1980) "The Industry Characteristics of lntra-Third
World Trade in Manufactures", Economic Development and
Cultural Change, Vol. 29, No. 1, October, pp. 1-19
Bell, R.T. (1973a) Industrial Decentralisation in South Africa
(Oxford University Press, Cape Town)
Bell, R.T. (1973b) "Some Aspects of Industrial Decentralisation
in South Africa", South African Journal of Economics, Vol. 41,
No. 4, December
Bell, R.T. (1983) The Growth and Structure of Manufacturing Employment
in Natal, Institute for Social and Economic Research, University
of Durban-Westville, Occasional Paper No. 7, September
Bell, R.T. (1984a) "The State, the Market and the Inter-Regional
Distribution of Industry in South Africa", Carnegie Conference
Paper No. 243, Cape Town, 13-19 April
Bell, R.T. (1984b) Unemployment in South Africa, Institute for
Social and Economic Research, University of Durban-Westville,
Occasional Paper No. 10, June
Bridgman, D. (1984) "The Ciskeian Experience", Paper read at
a joint workshop of the Friedrick Ebert Stiftung, Bonn and
Economic Research Unitf University of Natal on "Industrial
Decentralisation", Durban 23-24 May
Glaser, D. (1983) "The Regional Strategies of the S.A. State: A
Proposed Periodisation", Paper presented at a conference
held at the University of Transkei, Umtata (mimeo.)
Hirsch, Alan (1983) "The Study of Industrial Decentralisation Policy
in South Africa - Some Comments" (Centre for African Studies,
University of Cape Town, Africa Seminar, Thursday 24 March)
Lacey, Marian (1982) "Locating Employment, Relocating Unemployment",
in South African Research Service (ed . ) , "Homeland Tragedy,
function and Farce", SARS, 1982, p . 48
Murray, Fergus (1983) "The Decentralisation of Production - the
Decline of the Mass-Collective Worker?", Capital and Class,
No. 19, Spring
Rostow, W.W. (1978) The World Economy: History and Prospect (The
Macmillan Press Ltd, London and Bassingstoke)
Spies, M. (1984) "The KwaZulu Experience", Paper read at a joint
workshop of the Friedrick Ebert Stiftung, Bonn and Economic
Research Unit, University of Natal on "Industrial Decentralisation",
Durban 23-24 May
Thompson, T.G. (1984) "Trying to Market Pietermaritzburg", Paper
read at a joint workshop of the Friedrick Ebert Stiftung,
Bonn and Economic Research Unit, University of Natal on
"Industrial Decentralisation," Durban 23-24 May
Todes, A. and Watson, V. (1984) "Growth Pole Theory and Regional
Development in South Africa: Results of a Survey in Selected
Growth Areas", Carnegie Conference Paper Mo. 245, Cape Town,
13-19 April
Tomlinson, R. (1983) "Industrial Decentralisation and the Relief
of Poverty in the South African Homelands", South African
Journal of Economics, Vol. 51, No. 4, December, 544-563
Whiteside, A. (1984) Unpublished interim report on research into
"Labour Relations in Southern Africa", Economic Research
Unit, University of Natal, Durban
Zille, Helen (1983a) "Restructuring the Industrialisation Strategy",
in South African Review I: Same Foundations, New Facades?
(Ravan Press; Johannesburg) edited and compiled by SARS
(South African Research Service)
Zille, Helen (1983b) "Deciphering Decentralisation", in L. Cooper
and D. Kaplan (eds.) Reform and Response: Selected Research
Papers on Aspects of contemporary South Africa (University
of Cape Town, Department of Economic History)
